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ABSTRACT 
 
Preferences, Information, and Group Decision Making. 
(August 2008) 
Alejandro Espinoza, B.A., University of California, Irvine 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Nehemia Geva 
 
This study will examine how the structure of preferences of group members in a 
decision-making group, as well as the information they have, affects the collection and 
the processing of information by individual members of a decision making group.  
Structure of preferences in this study will represent each individual group members’ 
preference towards a particular course of action.  Using an experimental method of 
analysis, this study will examine how the preference structure of a group affects what 
and how much information a group member will analyze before making a decision.  I 
hypothesize that the structure of the group members’ preferences should affect the 
subjects’ search and process of information.  This study aims to answer the following 
questions; do group preferences affect the search and processing of information?  Do 
group members thoroughly survey the objectives and alternatives in the decision making 
process? 
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INTRODUCTION 
Decision-making and information processing in foreign policy are usually not the 
affairs of only one person but are a collective enterprise.  These activities are usually 
undertaken by professional organizations or small groups composed of politicians and 
top bureaucrats, like cabinet members and their advisors.  Examples of situations in 
which the members of a group interact with one another in order to arrive at a decision 
are quite common.  For example, Legislative committees, cabinets, military juntas, 
politburos of ruling parties, and executive councils.  The operation of many government 
ministries and agencies suggest that groups are also frequently at the core of the 
bureaucratic process.  Therefore collective decision-making is viewed as a social act 
unlike the task facing the solitary decision-makers.  In this context important questions 
arise concerning the dynamics of group decision-making.  For example, questions 
regarding how organizational processes, the interactions among individuals in the 
decision-making group, as well as interactions between that group and other 
information-processing organizations and individuals (1) affect the search and selection 
and evaluation of information, (2) the degree of openness to inconsistent information, 
and (3) the process of adaptation to new incoming information (Vertzberger 1990, pg. 
192).  
 This study aims at examining the effects of group preferences and information in 
group decision making.  First, this study will examine how the structure of preferences 
of group members in a decision-making group affects the collection and the processing 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of Political Psychology. 
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of information by individual members of the group; and second, examine how 
 information influences a group members’ decision when controlling for group 
preferences.   
By group decision making I mean an entity of two or more people all whom 
interact directly with one another and collectively reach a decision.  No definite 
boundaries are proposed with respect to the upper limit of group size.  Thus, the group 
may be as small as two or three people or as large as a parliament of hundreds, so long 
as there is a collective, interactive decision process in which all the members who are 
needed to make authoritative comments participate (Hermann et.al., 2001).  In practice, 
however, it is not uncommon for many large groups to subdivide into committees, 
coalitions, or other subsets to conduct much of their decision making.  
 Another component to the group is the power to execute decisions.  A groups’ 
power or authority to execute decisions varies.  For example, in many situations groups 
may come to a decision on a particular problem but do not have the authority to execute 
the decision.  At times, group decisions may simply be recommendations to be expressed 
to the person or persons having the authority to make the final decision.  For a group to 
be authoritative, it must have the definitive ability to commit or withhold the relevant 
governmental resources on the subject matter of the decision even if the entity is ad hoc 
or not part of an established institutional structure.  The ability to commit or withhold 
resources does not mean that group members themselves will actually implement the 
decision, leaving open potential discrepancies between choice and action (Hermann 
et.al., 2001).               
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 In differentiating a single group from the predominant leader and coalition 
decision units, the literature recognizes several boundary issues.  When a strong leader 
operates with a group of advisers, we may have difficulty determining whether the unit 
is a predominant leader or a single group.  As long as the leader alone has the power to 
commit the regime’s resources and does not delegate formally or tacitly that decision to 
advisers, the unit is a predominant leader.  Another potential ambiguity arises when, for 
example, a parliamentary government consists of a multiparty coalition cabinet.  In this 
case, the distinction must be made between the single group and coalition of autonomous 
actors whose representatives might meet together.  When individual cabinet members 
are bound to specific positions taken elsewhere, by their political party, and they are not 
free to act independently, then the authoritative decision unit is a coalition.  If however, 
the cabinet officers can form or change their positions on a problem without outside 
consultation, then the unit is a single group (Hermann et.al., 2001). 
 Groups in this study will consist of five members and will not have one central 
leader.  The group does not have the ability to commit or withhold the relevant 
governmental resources on the subject matter of the decision.  The group will merely 
recommend the best option to best deal with the hypothetical Foreign Policy Scenario.    
To reiterate, this study will examine how the structure of preferences of group 
members in a decision-making group, as well as the information they have, affects the 
collection and the processing of information by individual members of a group.  
Structure of preferences in this study will represent each individual group members’ 
preference towards a particular course of action.  Using an experimental method of 
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analysis, this study will examine how the preference structure of a group affects what 
and how much information a subject will analyze before making a decision.  I 
hypothesize that the structure of the group members’ preferences should affect the 
subjects’ search and process of information.  This study aims to answer the following 
questions; do group preferences affect the search and processing of information?  Do 
group members thoroughly survey the objectives and alternatives in the decision making 
process?  Although the hypothetical scenario that serves as the context for decision in 
this study takes place in the realm of Foreign Policy, this study has implications that 
cross other disciplines where group decision is prevalent. 
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GROUP DECISION MAKING 
 The study of group decision making suggest two major categories of activities 
essential to choice, the processing of information and the management of options.  The 
actual performances of group information and option management are intertwined.  For 
analytical purposes, however, it is useful to distinguish between them.  Information 
management concerns the array of issues associated with the nature, structuring, and 
dissemination of information within a group.  Option management concerns the 
development, advocacy, assessment, and selection of an option or alternative.  An option 
or alternative is an expressed means of treating or coping with a recognized problem 
including as one possibility doing nothing (Hermann et.al., 2001).      
To reach a group decision, subjects in a group engage in three information 
processing activities simultaneously; (1) information exchange (giving or receiving 
information), (2) information processing (assessing the cognitive and social implications 
of the information and storing it in memory), and (3) information recall (either from 
memory or notes (Briggs, 1995).  Humans have a limited amount of cognitive resources 
to spread across these three activities (Ball and Zuckerman, 1992; Norman, 1976).  Most 
people can engage in only one activity at one time, so that engaging in any one activity 
limits the ability to engage in the other two (Dennis, 1996).  
Groups are of different sizes, importance, and functions in the decision-making 
process.  Yet all groups have a number of attributes in common, members interact 
continually, members share a basic set of shared values, attitudes, and beliefs.  Members 
also divide formal and informal roles among themselves (DeLamater, 1974).  These 
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attributes generate the core context for the behavior of decision-makers acting as 
information processors within a small group setting. 
 Group effects on the quality of information processing are complex.  Decision-
makers operating in a group are more likely to be exposed to new information and 
interpretations because of the various points of view and interpretations of the 
information made available by each member of the group.  Subjects typically have a host 
of information about alternatives.  This information shapes subjects’ pre-discussion 
preferences and, as subjects communicate information during discussion, shapes the 
group’s decision.  The information that subjects hold can be distributed in a variety of 
ways.  Information can be, (1) Common, known to all subjects before group discussion, 
(2) Unique, known to only one participant before group discussion, and (3) Partially 
Shared, known to some but not all subjects before group discussion (Dennis,1996 pg. 
434).  For example, the group exposes the individual to arguments over the information 
the individual might not have been aware of as an independent decision-maker.  Both the 
exposure and diverse interpretations of information affects the quality of group 
member’s problem solving and learning.  In theory the group decision making provide 
individual decision makers with a larger scope for learning and a broader and more 
complex approach to the analysis of information.  
 There are also limitations that are associated with group decision making, for 
example, groupthink and group polarization.  Groupthink refers to the most extreme case 
of group conformity, which arises from concurrence seeking and reflects the collective 
defensive avoidance of dissonant information (Janis, 1982; Janis and Mann 1977).  The 
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occurrence of groupthink depends on a number of antecedent conditions, which will be 
discussed later.   
 Argumentation is another important process in group decision-making because it 
clarifies ambiguities and inconsistencies caused by disseminating information and 
alternative perspectives, which can illuminate weaknesses in the logical structure of 
accumulated knowledge and beliefs, particularly with regard to complex problems and 
for group members who show a moderate to high cognitive complexity (Davis, 1978; 
Stein and Tanter, 1980).  Some scholars argue that group decision-making can have a 
de-biasing effect causing individual members to rethink and reconsider their judgments 
by exposing their biases, particularly their motivational biases, in the process of group 
discussion (Vertzberger, 1990 pg. 223).  Hoffman argues that this potential often 
remains unfulfilled because other attributes and pathologies of the group act to narrow 
the scope.  The complexity of information processing operations encourages 
parochialism and conformity, which reinforce existing biases.  In order for a group to 
work cooperatively and effectively it must have a diversity of viewpoints, accompanied 
by a tolerance for differences of opinion (1978).  If the diverse opinions are not 
welcomed by the group then this may prevent individual group members from 
contributing different view points and cause group members to agree to the status quo.   
 On the other hand, a large number of alternative interpretations can cause 
information overload, increasing ambiguity and thereby making errors, or encouraging 
the avoidance of decisions altogether.  Groups develop procedural norms for information 
processing that reflects their experience.  Groups successful in processing large amounts 
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of information are better prepared to attend to most available information and those that 
fail foster procedures to avoid information.  In both cases, if a problem is perceived as 
having an obvious solution, group members tend to avoid investing resources in 
collecting and analyzing information and risking intra-group dissent by in-depth 
discussion (Burnstein and Berbaum, 1983). 
 After processing all the available information the members of a decision making 
group must choose one alternative from among two or more alternatives.  Individual 
group members typically have preferences among the various alternatives, and these 
preferences often differ from individual to individual.  One person would like the group 
to choose one alternative, while another person would like the group to choose a 
different alternative.  A problem thus arises as to how the preferences of the different 
individuals are to be combined into a group decision.  This problem is frequently 
resolved through the use of some formal decision rule, such as majority rule or 
unanimity.  Even in the absence of a formal or explicit decision rule, a group decision 
can often be regarded as stemming from the application of some informal or implicit rule 
(Miller, 1985). 
 This study consists of two experiments to examine how the preference structure 
of a group affects what and how much information a subject will analyze before making 
a decision and whether the information itself offsets the bias of the groups preference 
toward a foreign policy scenario.  Subjects are assigned to a group with four hypothetical 
members.  Subjects will know the group members preference towards a Foreign Policy 
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scenario prior to voting on a course of action.  The assignment into one of the groups 
should affect the subjects’ search and process of information.   
From Theory to Experimentation 
 The move from theory to research is not a simple one in Foreign Policy decision-
making.  There are no large n-data and the reliance on a thorough case study is difficult 
because records, if they exist, do not necessarily conform to variables that are central to 
theory.  Therefore, in line with numerous studies in social psychology and a few in 
Foreign Policy, I embark on an experimental/simulation route. 
 The central goal of the experimental simulation method is that it will be possible 
to maintain control of the experimental environment.  The more control one has over the 
experimental environment, the more one can ensure that all the variables other than the 
critical independent variables are held constant, thereby decreasing or eliminating the 
possibility of extraneous or confounding variables having a causal role in producing the 
observed effects.  This means increased confidence in the internal validity of 
experimental findings.  However, experimental control usually comes at the cost of 
increased artificiality of the experimental environment.  This means decreased external 
validity or generalizability of any observed cause and effect relationships.  On the other 
hand, the closer the experimental environment is to a real world setting, the more likely 
that any experimental result will be valid in the real world situation.   
 For the purpose of this study, groups were developed which contained group 
members with specific views towards a foreign policy scenario.  This prevents from 
having to assign roles to a group of five subjects, otherwise making it difficult to control 
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for the subjects personal feelings about their assigned role, which may bias the results.  
The use of hypothetical group members ensures that the group members are providing 
the subject with the exact information developed for this experiment.  Otherwise, if I had 
decided to assign roles live group members, I would not be able to control their personal 
biases concerning the role that they are portraying.  In sum, using hypothetical allows for 
more controls in how the information is disseminated to the initial subject.   
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EXPERIMENT 1: COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION 
 
    The objective in Experiment 1 is to examine how the preference structure of 
the group affects the collection and analysis of information by individual group 
members.  Experiment 1 consists of three conditions.  Subjects will be assigned to either 
a Split vote (2 to 2) group or one of the two Majority vote (3 to 1) groups.  One of the 
Majority vote groups’ distribution favors option A and in the other Majority vote groups’ 
distribution favors option B.  Figure 1 shows the preference structure of each of the three 
groups/conditions. 
 
Condition 1 
Split Vote Group 
2A to 2B 
Condition 2 
Majority Vote Group 
3A to 1B 
Condition 3 
Majority Vote Group 
3B to 1A 
  Figure 1: Preference Structure of Each Group/Condition 
                         
Each hypothetical group member will provide five pieces of information that supports 
his/hers preference.  Subjects in the Split vote (2 to 2) group are provided with evenly 
balanced information concerning both options on the Foreign Policy scenario, whereas 
subjects in the Majority vote groups get more information concerning the preferred 
option.     
Hypotheses 
 Groupthink refers to the most extreme case of group conformity, which arises 
from concurrence seeking and reflects the collective defensive avoidance of dissonant 
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information (Janis, 1982; Janis and Mann 1977).  The occurrence of groupthink depends 
on a number of antecedent conditions.  One major condition of groupthink is 
cohesiveness, or the desire of personal acceptance of group members by other group 
members.  Groupthink is more probable where most members of a cohesive group feel 
insecure (Flowers, 1977; Longley and Pruitt, 1980).   
 The Majority vote (3 to 1) groups addresses the effects of groupthink.  Because 
the majority of the group members in the Majority vote groups favor one option over the 
other, this scenario will help examine the influence of the other group members’ 
preferences on the vote/choice and the information collected by the subject.  Hypothesis 
1 tests Burnstein and Berbaum’s claim that, “… if a problem is perceived as having an 
obvious solution, group members tend to avoid investing resources in collecting and 
analyzing information and risking intra-group dissent by in-depth discussion (1983).” 
H1: In experiment 1, subjects in the Majority vote (3 to 1) groups will 
vote in line with the majority of the group compared to subjects in the 
Split vote (2 to 2) group. 
 
The way in which information is processed may also change depending on 
whether subjects are aware of the other group members’ preferences.  When faced by a 
group majority whose preferences are different from theirs, subjects assume the majority 
to be correct and focus on comparing their preferences to that of the majority 
(Moscovici, 1980).  In contrast, when faced by a minority with a different preference, 
subjects are motivated to assume that minority subjects are incorrect and initially dismiss 
them (Maass and Clark 1984; Nemeth 1986).  On the other hand, according to Harkins 
and Petty, information from minority subjects may be more thoroughly processed than 
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information from the majority because minority subjects are perceived to be more 
independent or more dissimilar from one another than are members of the majority 
(1987).  These two conceptualizations, minority and majority, can lead to two different 
predictions and this study will address this by documenting whether subjects are 
gathering information from the majority or minority.   
According to Moscovici (1980) subjects in the Majority vote groups will 
perceive the majority as correct, and because the subject votes in line with the majority, 
the subject in the Majority vote group should report a higher confidence level on their 
final vote/choice.  Subjects in the Split vote group, on the other hand, are the deciding 
vote and therefore may be less confident of their vote/choice because the ultimate 
outcome is due to their vote. 
H2: In experiment 1, subjects in the Majority vote Groups will report a 
higher level of confidence than subjects in the Split vote Group. 
 
Subjects in the Split vote group have a higher incentive than subjects in the 
Majority vote groups to consider all arguments carefully before making a decision 
because they are the deciding vote.  If the information provided is critically analyzed 
than the subject should be able to recall more pieces of information than subjects that 
were assigned to either of the two Majority vote groups.  This brings us to Hypothesis 3 
H3: In experiment 1, individuals in the Split vote (2 to2) group will recall 
more pieces of information than subjects in the Majority vote (3 to 1) 
groups.     
 
Preference structure should also have an affect of time.  Because subjects in the 
Split vote group are essentially the deciding vote, they will be analyzing more 
information, therefore taking longer a longer amount of time analyzing the items of 
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information.  If subjects in the Majority vote group are voting in line with the majority 
then they have little incentive to look at as much information possible, therefore making 
their vote quicker.  Hypothesis 4: 
 H4: In experiment 1, subjects in the Split vote (2 to 2) group will take a 
longer time making a choice than subjects in the Majority vote (3 to 1) 
groups.   
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EXPERIMENT 1: METHODOLOGY 
 
 In this experiment, subjects decide what and how much information will be 
viewed before making a decision.  Subjects will read a hypothetical Foreign Policy 
scenario, gather and analyze information, and finally make a choice on the option to deal 
with the dilemma in the scenario.   Subjects will be randomly assigned to either the Split 
vote (2 to 2) group or one of the two Majority vote (3 to 1) groups, where the majority of 
the group is favoring one course of action over the other.  There are two versions of the 
Majority vote (3 to 1) group, subjects will be assigned to the Majority vote (3 to 1) group 
favoring option A or the Majority vote (3 to 1) group favoring option B.  Experiment 1 
consists of 59 subjects.  Twenty subjects were randomly assigned to the Split vote (2 to 
2) group, 19 subjects were assigned to the Majority vote (3 to 1) group favoring option 
A, and 20 subjects were assigned to the Majority vote (3 to 1) group favoring option B.  
All subjects were recruited from undergraduate Political Science courses at Texas A&M 
University. 
Variables 
 Experiment 1 consists of one independent variable, the preference structure of 
the group.  Subjects will be assigned to one of three groups, each containing a different 
preference structure, the Split vote (2 to 2) group, or one of the two Majority vote (3 to 
1) groups, one Majority vote group favors option A and the other favors option B.  There 
are four dependent variables.  The first dependent variable is time.  The computer keeps 
track of how long it takes subjects to make a vote/choice.  Time is measured in seconds.  
The second dependent variable is vote/choice, Intervene or Do Nothing.  Vote/choice is 
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coded as “1” for intervene and “0” for Do Nothing.  The third dependent variable is the 
number of recalled items of information.  In a post-experiment questionnaire subjects 
had the opportunity to list all the items of information they remember receiving from the 
four hypothetical group members.  There are a total of twenty items of information.  
Finally, the fourth dependent variable is confidence.  In the post-experiment 
questionnaire the subject will be asked, “How confident are you on your vote? Please 
rate on a scale of “0” to “10”, “0” being not confident and “10” being very confident. 
Experiment Procedure 
 The experiment is computer based.  The subject read a hypothetical Foreign 
Policy scenario, analyze information, and cast a vote on their preferred course of action, 
Intervene (option A) or Do Nothing (option B).  The hypothetical Foreign Policy 
scenario is the same for all subjects regardless of what group they are randomly assigned 
to. 
 After the subject reads the hypothetical Foreign Policy scenario, the subject is 
introduced to his four hypothetical group members.  At this point the subject will also 
learn the preferences of each group member.  The subject will then be able to ‘click’ on 
the individual group member and view information provided by that member, one piece 
of information at a time.  The information provided by the hypothetical group member is 
congruent with that group members vote.  None of the hypothetical group members will 
provide information that is incongruent with their individual vote.  The subject does not 
have any time restrains.  The subject is free to cast their vote on option A or option B at 
any time.  
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Step 1: Instructions 
Subjects sit in front of computers.  Each subject has a paper copy of instructions, 
while the investigator reads instructions aloud.  After instructions have been read, the 
investigator will answer any questions that the subjects have. 
Instructions 
 
This experiment is seeking information on group decision-making.  All of your responses 
will be anonymous.  You will be presented with a hypothetical Foreign Policy scenario 
that provides a description of a humanitarian scenario in another country.  After you 
finished reading the scenario you will be introduced to the members of your committee, 
who have already voted. The other members of the committee have started analyzing the 
scenario earlier and each of the four committee members have voted. You will be able to 
click on each committee member and access a piece of information that supports that 
committee members’ individual vote.  After viewing a piece of information from one of 
the committee members, you will have the option to view additional information or cast 
your vote.  You will not be able to view the same information more than once so please 
pay close attention.  Please cast your vote carefully 
 
Step 2: Read Scenario Intro 
 
After reading the instructions subjects read the hypothetical Foreign Policy 
scenario presented to them in the next screen.  After the subjects read the following 
scenario the subjects were presented with the vote distribution of their four fellow 
committee members.  Each of the four hypothetical committee members had already 
voted on a preferred course, Intervene or Do Nothing.   
Scenario 
 
You are a member of a five member citizen committee chosen to vote and recommend 
whether the United States should intervene in a humanitarian effort in Burundi.  
Burundi's first democratically elected president was assassinated in October 1993 after 
only four months in office. Since then, some 2,000,000 Burundians have perished in 
widespread, intense ethnic violence between Hutu and Tutsi factions. Hundreds of 
thousands have been internally displaced or have become refugees in neighboring 
countries. Burundi troops have been deployed to deal with upsurges in rebel activity, but 
have been unable to maintain peace due to high levels of casualties.  While the 
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Government of Burundi signed a cease-fire agreement in December 2002 with three of 
Burundi's four Hutu rebel groups, implementation of the agreement has been 
problematic and one rebel group refuses to sign on and localized violence continues 
despite UN peacekeeping efforts, clouding prospects for sustainable peace.  The UN has 
pleaded the United States and other countries to intervene in helping Burundi troops 
keep peace, provide much needed food, and medical supplies. 
 
You must vote to: 
 
Option A 
Intervene 
Send Troops, Food, Medical, and other Military Supplies. 
 
Option B 
Do Nothing 
 
Step 3: Group Member Vote 
 
The subjects are told that the other four members of the committee have started 
analyzing the scenario earlier and each of the four committee members have already 
voted.  After reading the scenario, subjects were presented with the votes of the four 
committee members.  Figure 2 shows a sample screen for a subject in the Split vote (2 to 
2) group. 
Members Alex and Bob vote to Intervene; Carl and Dave vote to Do Nothing 
 
 
 
Committee Members 
 
       Intervene Do Nothing 
Alex     Bob                         Carl     Dave 
 
 
Click on any member for Information 
   Figure 2: Split Vote Group Member Preferences  
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Figure 3 shows a Sample Screen for a subject in the Majority vote (3 to 1) group: 
Members Alex, Bob, and Carl vote to Intervene  
Dave votes to Do Nothing 
 
 
Committee Members 
 
       Intervene Do Nothing 
Alex     Bob    Carl                       Dave 
 
 
Click on any member for Information 
   Figure 3: Majority Vote Group Member Preferences 
 
 
 
The subject is able to “click” on each group member and read a piece of information that 
supports that group members’ vote.  Appendix A lists the complete listing of information 
provided by each hypothetical group members in Experiment 1 for each of the three 
groups, the Split vote group and both Majority vote groups.  Figure 4 shows a sample 
screen for how an item of information will be displayed. 
 
 
Alex 
 
There will be minimal risk for U.S. troops 
in Burundi 
 
 
 
Additional 
Information  
 
 
 
Vote 
   Figure 4: Item of Information Sample Screen 
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None of the four hypothetical group members will provide incongruent information.  
The hypothetical group members will only provide information supporting their 
individual vote on a preferred course of action.  After viewing the piece of information, 
the subjects can choose to look at additional information or cast their vote.  The subject 
can casts a vote at any time.  If the subject chooses to view additional information the 
subject will return to the Committee Members’ screen.  Figure 5 shows the sample 
screen. 
                                 
                                 
Committee Members 
 
       Intervene Do Nothing 
Alex     Bob                           Carl    Dave 
 
 
Click on any member for Information 
   Figure 5: Returning to Member Preferences 
 
 
 
Subjects will only be able to look at a piece of information once. 
Step 4: Vote 
 
Once the subject is ready to cast their vote, the subject will come to a screen where they 
are able to ‘click’ on their desired course of action.  Figure 6 shows the voting screen. 
 
Option A 
Intervene 
Send Troops, Food, Medical, and other Military Supplies. 
 
Option B 
Do Nothing   
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VOTE 
 
 
 
          Intervene    
 
        Do Nothing 
   Figure 6: Voting Screen 
                                     
Step 5: Questionnaire  
After the subject voted on their preferred course of action, the subject will fill-out 
a post-experiment questionnaire.  The subject is asked, “How confident are you on your 
vote? Please rate on a scale of “0” to “10”, “0” being not confident and “10” being very 
confident.  Next, the subject is presented with a “recall distracter” questionnaire before 
the subjects is asked to recall information from the experiment.  The “recall distracter” 
questionnaire asked the subject to list the capital of 20 countries.  The subject is asked to 
fill-in as many capitols as they can.  After completing the “recall distracter” 
questionnaire, the subject is then asked to recall as many pieces of information they can 
remember.  The question is as follows, “Following the initial crisis scenario and prior to 
making your decision, you have reviewed different items of information.  In the next few 
minutes, try to recall as many of the items of information you have seen before making 
your decision.  The order in which you recall the information items is not important.  
Write each item of information in a separate block.  When you are done please ‘click’ on 
‘Finished’.   
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EXPERIMENT 1: RESULTS 
 
Vote/Choice   
I hypothesized that subjects in the Majority vote groups would vote congruent to 
the groups’ preference.  Subjects either voted for “1” Intervene or “0” Do Nothing.  The 
results of the ANOVA analysis confirmed my hypothesis.  The structure of the group 
had a statistically significant effect on vote/choice (F(2,56)= 4.12, p<0.05).  Figure 7 
shows the distribution of means for vote/choice by each group.  Subjects in the Split vote 
group overwhelmingly chose option A, Intervene (M=.75).  Subjects in the Majority vote 
group favoring option A also chose option A significantly more often (M=.84).  Subjects 
in the Majority vote group favoring option B were less likely to vote for option A, 
(M=.45), but not by much, it was just about a half and half split.  Subjects in both 
Majority vote groups were more likely to vote congruent with the preferences of the 
hypothetical group members which supports my hypothesis.  The Scheffe post-hoc 
contrast analysis shows that such effect is only significant for the difference between 
both Majority vote groups, (p < 0.05). 
The results also show that option A (Intervene) seemed like the preferred choice 
for the majority of subjects.  Seventy-five percent of subjects in the Split vote group 
chose option A, which shows this option to be more appealing to subjects.  For example, 
subjects in the Majority vote group favoring option B voted in line with the Majority, but 
it was not by much, only 55% percent of these subjects voted for option B.     
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 Figure 7: Distribution of Mean for Vote/Choice 
  
 
Confidence 
Structure also had statistically significant effect on confidence, (F(2,56)=7.54, 
p<0.02).  Figure 8 shows the distribution of means for confidence by group.  Subjects in 
the in Split vote group were less confident of their choice, (M=4.35), which is in line 
with my hypothesis.  The subjects in both majority vote groups were more confident in 
their choice.  Subjects in the Majority vote group favoring option A reported a 
confidence level of (M= 6.05) and subjects in the Majority vote group favoring option B 
reported a confidence level of (M=7.05).  The results of the Majority vote group 
favoring option B are interesting.  This group reported a higher level of confidence.  This 
group had a higher proportion compared to the other two groups of going against the 
Majority.  Subjects in the Majority vote group favoring option B reported a higher level 
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of confidence on their vote/choice, but also had a higher proportion of subjects voting 
against the majority.  In order to vote against the group I suspect that subjects had a 
higher level of confidence that they are correct and the majority of the group is wrong.  
The Scheffe post-hoc contrast analysis shows that such effect is only significant for the 
difference between the Majority vote group favoring option B and the Split vote group, 
(p < 0.05).   
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      Figure 8: Distribution of Means for Confidence 
 
Time   
Structure had a statistically significant effect on time at the p< .10 significance 
level, (F(2,56)=2.79,p<.07).  Figure 9 shows the distribution of mean time for each 
group. The subjects in the Split vote group took a longer time than subjects in both 
Majority vote groups.  The subjects in the Split vote group had a mean time of M=70.85 
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(seconds).  Subjects in the Majority vote group favoring option B had a mean time of 
M=57.5 (seconds) and subjects in the Majority vote group favoring option A had a mean 
time of M=53.42 (seconds). 
The results are in line with the hypothesis.  Subjects in the Split vote group took 
a longer time analyzing the information because they were the deciding vote.  Because 
these subjects are the deciding vote, therefore may feel compelled to analyze as much 
information prior to making the vote/choice. 
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       Figure 9: Distribution of Mean Time 
 
   
 
Recall 
Finally, structure also had a statistical effect on recall at the p<.05 significance 
level, (F(2,56)=4.73, p<0.01).  Figure 10 shows the mean distribution of the amount of 
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recalled items by each group.  Subjects in the Split vote group recalled more pieces of 
information than subjects in both Majority vote groups, which is in line with my 
hypothesis.  Subjects in the Split vote group recalled (M=4.55) pieces of information and 
subjects in the Majority vote groups favoring option A and option B recalled (M=2.63) 
and (M=2.7) pieces of information, respectively.  I then recoded recall to analyze 
whether structure had an effect on the type of information subjects recalled, whether 
subjects recalled more information concerning option A or option B.  
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  Figure 10: Mean Distribution of Recalled Items 
   
Structure had a statistically significant effect on the amount of information recalled for 
option A (F(2,56)=4.47, p<0.01).  Groups recalled different amounts of information 
concerning each option.  Subjects in the Split group level recalled more information 
concerning option A, (M= 3.3).  Subjects in the Majority vote group favoring option A 
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and subjects in the Majority vote group favoring option B remembered (M=2.15) and 
(M=1.95) pieces of information concerning option A, respectively.   
Structure also had a statistically significant effect on the amount of information 
recalled for option B, (F(2,56)= 2.73, p<.07).  Subjects did not recall as much 
information for option B as they did for option B.  Subjects in the Split vote group 
recalled the most pieces of information concerning option B, (M=1.25).  Subjects in the 
Majority vote group favoring option A recalled (M=.474) for option B and subjects in 
the Majority vote group favoring option B recalled (M=.75) for option B.  Subjects 
remembered more information concerning option A than option B.  The Scheffe post-
hoc contrast analysis shows that such effect is only significant for the difference between 
each Majority vote group and the Split vote group, (p < 0.05).  There is no statistically 
significant difference between the Majority vote groups. 
According to Moscovici, when individuals in a group are faced by a group 
majority whose preferences are different from theirs, subjects assume the majority to be 
correct and focus on comparing their preferences to that of the majority (1980).  In 
contrast, when faced by a minority with a different preference, subjects are motivated to 
assume that minority subjects are incorrect and initially dismiss them (Maass and Clark 
1984; Nemeth 1986).  According to Harkins and Petty, information from minority 
subjects may be more thoroughly processed than information from the majority because 
minority subjects are perceived to be more independent or more dissimilar from one 
another than are members of the majority (1987).  Only subjects in the Majority vote 
group favoring option B looked at more information from group members with minority 
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preferences.  One reason for this may be that option A was the more favorable option for 
subjects.  Subjects in the Majority vote group favoring option A recalled less pieces of 
information concerning option B (M=.474) than subjects in the Majority vote group 
favoring option B recalled pieces of information concerning option A (M=1.95). 
Conclusion 
 The results for experiment 1 are interesting.  Structure had a statistically 
significant effect on all four dependent variables, vote/choice, confidence, time, and 
recall.  The key dependent variable in this experiment was vote/choice.  One important 
note is that subjects in the Split vote overwhelmingly chose option A (Intervene) as their 
vote/choice (M= .75), which tells me that option A was the preferred option by subjects. 
Subjects in the Majority vote group favoring option A chose option A the majority of the 
time (M= .842).  Subjects in the Majority vote group favoring option B, on the other 
hand, only voted congruent with the groups’ preference 55% of the time.  Although the 
results show that option A was the preferred choice of all the subjects in the experiment, 
55% of subjects in Majority vote group favoring option B did manage to be influence by 
the groups’ preferences and voted congruent with the groups’ preferences. 
 Subjects in the Majority vote groups showed a higher level of confidence 
compared to subjects in the Split vote group.  Subjects in the Majority vote group 
favoring option B expressed the highest level of confidence with their vote.  This could 
be due to the fact the almost half (45%) went against group preference and chose option 
A, which is interesting.  This may be due to the fact that in order to go against group 
preference, one must exude a high level of confidence that they are correct and the group 
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is wrong.  Subjects in the Split vote group showed the least amount of confidence for 
their vote/choice.  This may be due to the fact that these subjects are the deciding vote 
and the fact that there was no consensus towards a particular course of action may have 
inhibited the subjects’ confidence on their vote/choice.  
 Subjects in the Split vote group took a longer time on the experiment than 
subjects in both Majority vote groups.  The subjects in the Split vote group also had a 
higher level of recall.  This means that subjects in the Split vote groups either took a 
longer time analyzing the information more carefully, by studying each item more 
carefully, or analyzed more pieces of information.  Because subjects in Experiment 1 
had the discretion to look at as much information as they feel warranted to make a 
vote/choice, it unfortunately does not tell us if the information itself had an affect on 
vote/choice.  It is possible that group preferences could have affected the amount of 
information the subject analyzed and it is impossible to measure the effect of the 
information without ensuring that the subjects read all the information prior to making 
their vote/choice. 
 In order to examine whether the information has an affect on group decision 
making, the following experiment will examine the affect of both preference structure 
and information.  In experiment 2 subjects must view all the information available 
before making a vote/choice.        
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EXPERIMENT 2: ANALYZING ALL THE INFORMATION 
  
 In experiment 2, subjects must analyze all the information provided by each 
hypothetical group member prior to making a vote/choice on a hypothetical Foreign 
Policy scenario.  Similar to experiment 1, subjects are assigned to one of two Split vote 
groups or one of two Majority vote groups.  In addition to structure, the balance of 
information is manipulated.  By balance of information I mean that subjects may receive 
more information by their group members supporting one option over the other.   
Regardless of the groups’ preferences, the information is either balanced or un-balanced.  
Each subject must analyze 20 pieces of information prior to making a vote/choice.  The 
information is balanced when the subject is presented with 10 items of information 
supporting one option and 10 items of information supporting the other option.  If the 
information is unbalanced then the subject is presented with 13 items supporting one 
option and 7 items supporting the other.  Figure 11 shows the four conditions of this 2x2 
experiment. 
  
Balanced Info          Unbalanced Info 
 
          Majority Vote 
 
 
Split Vote 
   
 Figure 11: Preference and Information Structure of Each Group/Condition  
3A to 1B 
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Info favoring A 
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Once information is exchanged, subjects must actually process it before it can 
affect decisions  There are two ‘routes’ by which information is processed (Petty and 
Cacioppo, 1986).  The first is the “central route,” in which subjects actively assess the 
information and its quality and integrate it into their overall understanding of the 
situation and their preferences.  This process of opinion formation is also called 
“persuasive arguments” or “information influence”.  The second route is the “peripheral 
route,” in which subjects preferences are shaped more by peripheral cues such as the 
attractiveness or number of people arguing for a position, rather than the quality of the 
information itself. 
Information influence theory holds that changes in preferences occur when 
subjects cognitively process key factual information (Shaw 1981).  When subjects learn 
new information from others, they consider this information in light of their existing 
information (Burnstein and Vinokur, 1973).  Once subjects begin to analyze the 
information, this new information should be given consideration apart from the groups’ 
preferences.  This reconsideration may result in a change in preference.  The key point is 
that under information influence theory, the information itself, not the preferences of 
others, causes the reconsideration and change in preferences.  Experiments have found 
that changes in preferences in cases where subjects’ ability to communicate was 
restricted to objective information, (no information about others’ preferences), providing 
evidence that information influence is present in group interaction (Burnstein and 
Vinokur, 1973; Dennis, 1996).   
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To test the influence theory (Shaw, 1981) subjects in both condition 2 and 
condition 4, are given the preferences of their fellow group members and are provided 
with an unbalanced set of information, where the amount of information favors one 
course of action aside from the groups’ preferences.  Condition 2 is a Majority vote 
group and condition 4 is a Split Vote group.  The information provided to the subjects by 
the hypothetical group members favors one course of action over the other, which if 
influence theory holds the subjects will vote for the option that is supported by the 
information regardless of the preferences of the individual group members.  This brings 
us to hypothesis 1:  
H1: In experiment 2, subjects in the un-balanced information groups will 
vote congruent with the information after analyzing all of the information 
provided.   
  
The way in which information is processed may also change depending on 
whether subjects are aware of the others’ preferences.  When faced by a group majority 
whose preferences are different from theirs, subjects assume the majority to be correct 
and focus on comparing their preferences to that of the majority (Moscovici, 1980).  In 
contrast, when faced by a minority with a different preference, subjects are motivated to 
assume that minority subjects are incorrect and initially dismiss them (Maass and Clark 
1984; Nemeth 1986).  According to Harkins and Petty, information from minority 
subjects may be more thoroughly processed than information from the majority because 
minority subjects are perceived to be more independent or more dissimilar from one 
another than are members of the majority (1987).   
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According to Moscovici (1980) subjects in the Majority vote groups will 
perceive that the majority as correct, and the fact that the subject votes in line with the 
Majority, then the subject should report a high confidence on their final vote/choice, 
similar to the results from experiment 1.  Subjects in the Split vote group on the other 
hand are the deciding vote and therefore may be less confident on their vote/choice. 
H2 In experiment 2, subjects in the Majority vote Groups should report 
being more confident than subjects in the Split vote Groups. 
 
If information affects group decision making then subjects should be able to 
recall more pieces of information, but if the subjects are influenced by the initial group 
preferences, which in some cases favors one course of action over the other, subjects 
may be inclined to vote congruent with the groups’ preferences and pay little attention to 
the information.  If group preferences affect group decision making then we should see 
that subjects in the Majority vote groups recall less items of information then subjects in 
the Split vote group: 
H3: In experiment 2, subjects in the Split vote Groups should recall more 
items of information than subjects in the Majority vote Groups.  
 
Because subjects in the Majority vote groups are paying less attention to the information, 
we should also see that the subjects in the Split vote groups taking a longer time 
analyzing the information and casting their vote. 
 
H4: In experiment 2, subjects in the Split vote groups will spend a longer 
time analyzing the information and making their vote/choice. 
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EXPERIMENT 2: METHODOLOGY  
 
 In experiment 2, the procedure is similar to experiment 1.  However, subjects in 
experiment 2 must view all the information available prior to casting their vote.  In 
experiment 1 subjects were free to cast their vote at any time, these subjects had the 
discretion to view as much or as little information as they felt warranted.  In experiment 
2 however, subjects must view all the information prior to making their vote/choice.   
Appendix B lists all of the information provided by each hypothetical group member in 
each of the four groups.  This experiment consists of four conditions and each condition 
has two components, structure and information distribution.  Figure 12 shows the four 
conditions of this 2x2 experiment. 
                    
Balanced Info          Unbalanced Info 
 
          Majority Vote 
 
 
                Split Vote 
  Figure 12: Preference and Information Structure of Each Group/Condition 
     
 
Experiment 2 is a 2x2 experiment and consists of 71 subjects.  All subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of four condition groups.  There were 19 subjects randomly 
assigned to condition 1, 21 subjects assigned to condition 2, 18 subjects assigned to 
condition 3, and 13 subjects assigned to condition 4.  Subjects were recruited from the 
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undergraduate Political Science population of Texas A&M University.  Subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of four conditions.      
Variables 
 Experiment 2 consists of two independent variables, structure and information.  
Structure represents the preferences of the group.  Subjects will be assigned to one of 
four groups, one of two Split vote (2 to 2) groups, or one of the two Majority vote (3 to 
1) groups.  For the descriptions of the four groups refer back to figure 12.  Information is 
measured as balanced or un-balanced.  Subjects are presented with 20 items of 
information, if the items are equally supporting both options then the information is 
balanced, 10 items supporting option A and 10 items supporting option B.  If the 
information is un-balanced then the there is 13 items supporting option A and 7 items 
supporting option B.  A complete listing of information items provided by each 
hypothetical group member is listed in Appendix B.   
There are four dependent variables.  The first dependent variable is time.  The 
computer keeps track of how long it takes subjects to make a choice on a preferred 
course of action.  Time is measured in seconds.  The second dependent variable is 
vote/choice, Intervene or Do Nothing.  Vote/choice is coded as “1” for intervene and “0” 
for Do Nothing.  The third dependent variable is the number of recalled items of 
information.  Subjects will list all the items of information they remember receiving 
from the four hypothetical group members.  There are a total of twenty items of 
information.  Finally, the fourth dependent variable is confidence.  The subject is asked, 
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“How confident are you on your vote? Please rate on a scale of “0” to “10”, “0” being 
not confident and “10” being very confident. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 37
EXPERIMENT 2: RESULTS 
 
Vote/Choice 
Information influence theory holds that changes in preferences occur when 
subjects cognitively process key factual information (Shaw 1981).  I hypothesized that 
subjects in the un-balanced Majority vote group (Condition 2) and subjects in the un-
balanced Split vote group (Condition 4) would vote congruent with the option favored 
by the information.  Neither structure nor information had a statistically significant affect 
on vote.  Subjects in the un-balanced Majority vote group (Condition 2) only voted 
congruent with the information half the time (M= .524) and subjects in the un-balanced 
Split vote group (Condition 4) also voted congruent with the information less than half 
the time (M= .462).  Figure 13 shows the means for vote/choice by each group. 
 
Balanced Info          Unbalanced Info 
 
          Majority Vote 
 
 
                Split Vote 
  Figure 13: Distribution of means for vote/choice for each group 
 
Confidence 
Structure had a statistically significant effect on the confidence of subjects vote 
(F(2, 67)= 3.85, p< 0.05).  Subjects in the Majority vote groups reported being less 
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confident on their vote than subjects in the Split vote groups, which differs from the 
results of experiment 1.  Subjects in the Majority vote groups reported a mean 
confidence level of (M=4.3) and subjects in the Split vote groups had a mean confidence 
level of (M=5.5), respectively.  Information was not statistically significant and the 
results show that there was little difference in confidence between subjects who were 
provided with balanced or un-balanced amounts of information.  Subjects in the 
balanced information groups reported a confidence level of (M= 4.9), while subjects in 
un-balanced information groups reported a confidence level of (M= 4.6).  
Time 
Structure and information did not have a statistically significant affect on the 
amount of time subjects took in analyzing the information.  Subjects in the balanced 
Majority vote group (Condition 1) had a mean time of (M=144.21) seconds and subjects 
in the un-balanced Majority vote group (Condition 2) had a mean time (M=164.14) 
seconds, respectively.  Subjects in the balanced Split vote group (Condition 3) had a 
mean time of (M=140.278) seconds, while subjects in the un-balanced Split vote group 
(Condition 4) had a mean time of (M= 153.46) seconds. 
Recall 
Structure had a statistically significant effect on recall, (F(2, 67)= 5.371, 
p<.0235).  I hypothesized that subjects in the Majority vote groups would recall less 
information than subjects in the Split vote groups.  Subjects in the Majority vote groups 
recalled (M=3.025) and subjects in the Split vote groups recalled (M=4.484).  Again the 
fact that subjects in the Split vote groups recalled more pieces of information may be due 
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to the fact that they were the deciding vote and therefore more critically analyzed the 
information, although it is only a small difference in recall.  Information again had no 
statistically significant effect on recall.      
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The purpose of this study was to examine in experiment 1 how the preference 
structure of a decision making group affects the collection and processing of information 
and in experiment 2 how the information itself affects the vote/choice.  In experiment 1, 
subjects were assigned to either a Split vote group or one of the two Majority vote 
groups, where the group favors one course of action over the other.  In experiment 2 
subjects’ were required to analyze all the information prior to making their vote/choice.  
 The results in experiment 1 showed that the preference structure had an affect on 
the amount of time subjects spent analyzing the information and making their 
vote/choice.  Subjects in the Split vote spent longer periods of time analyzing the 
information than subjects in both Majority vote groups.  This may be due to the fact that 
subjects in the Split vote group had an incentive to look more carefully at the 
information because they were the deciding vote.  Whereas subjects in the Majority vote 
group had less of an incentive to look at all the information because if the subject went 
against the groups’ preference, their vote, in essence, would not count.   
Groupthink refers to the most extreme case of group conformity, which arises 
from concurrence seeking and reflects the collective defensive avoidance of dissonant 
information (Janis, 1982; Janis and Mann 1977).  The occurrence of groupthink depends 
on a number of antecedent conditions.  One major condition of groupthink is 
cohesiveness, or the desire of personal acceptance of group members by other group 
members.  Groupthink is more probable where most members of a cohesive group feel 
insecure (Flowers, 1977; Longley and Pruitt, 1980).  The results for experiment 1 
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showed support for groupthink.  Subjects in both Majority vote groups voted congruent 
with the groups’ preferences.  This may have resulted out of the fact that subjects in the 
Majority vote groups did not want to go against the group and wanted to maintain group 
cohesiveness.  Another factor is the insecure ness towards choosing an option, subjects 
may have not been confident to make an independent choice and therefore may have 
defaulted to voting in-line with the groups preferences.    
 Forty-five subjects out of fifty-nine subjects in experiment 1 chose option A over 
option B.  Although structure did have a statistically significant affect on vote/choice, 
only about half, 55% of the subjects assigned to the Majority vote group favoring option 
B did actually vote congruent with the groups’ preference, option B.  The fact that the 
majority of subjects tended to vote for option A may have affected the results.  The 
results for recall confirm these speculations.   
Subjects in the Split vote group recalled more information than subjects in both 
Majority vote groups, which confirmed my hypothesis.  After breaking recall down, 
subjects recalled twice as many pieces of information concerning option A, which is 
another indication that option A was the more favorable option for subjects.  Out of all 
59 subjects in experiment 1, subjects recalled less than one piece of information, .74, 
concerning option B, but recalled 2.5 pieces of information concerning option A.  Again 
this is evidence that the favorability for option A may have affected the results and 
further research is needed.    
 Experiment 2 followed the same procedure as experiment 1.  Both structure and 
information were manipulated in experiment 2.  Results were not as promising for 
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experiment 2.  Structure had a statistically significant affect of recall and confidence, but 
information had no statistically significant affect on any of the four dependent variables.  
Again similar to experiment 1, the fact that Option A was more favorable may have 
affected the results.  Also, because subjects in experiment 2 had to go through all the 
information before casting their vote does not ensure that the subject is reading or 
analyzing every piece of information.   
 The results show that the preference structure of the group have an affect on how 
group members vote and the way they collect and analyze information.  The subjects 
were affected by the preference structure of their group.  These results have implications 
that transcend the study modern day politics and elections.  In very competitive elections 
where every states election matters, people may be more inclined to collect and analyze 
more information prior to voting than if the election was not as competitive because 
either a front runner has been identified or the apathy of voters who live in states that are 
heavily democratic or republican feel their vote will not count.  For example, states that 
are heavily republican may cause democratic voters not to vote, put little effort in 
researching the candidate, or voting with the majority because they feel their vote does 
not count.  Further research is needed to better understand these implications.        
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APPENDIX A 
 
Experiment 1 
Information provided by each Group-member 
Split Vote Group 
Your committee is split even (2 for Option A & 2 for Option B) 
Group members voting option A 
Group member #1 
• As the strongest country in the world, the U.S. has the responsibility to assist 
other countries in need. 
• Other countries are sending troops and supplies, therefore the United States 
should also send its share of troops 
• Sending troops and supplies along with other countries will minimize the time 
and resources that the U.S. needs to contribute 
• If the U.S does not intervene, more civilians will die and will be displaced 
• 2,000,000 civilians have died because of the lack of aid and intervention by other 
countries 
Group member #2 
• There will be minimal risk for U.S. troops in Burundi 
• U.S. troops will not engage in offensive missions or search and destroy missions 
• More countries involved in sending troops and supplies would maximize the 
chances of success 
• Burundi has suffered without aid from other countries for 14 years 
• Helping Burundi is a great opportunity in developing an allay in Africa for the 
U.S. 
Group members voting option B 
Group member #3 
• U.S. troops may get injured or be killed, it is impossible to anticipate attacks by 
rebels 
• Sending in U.S. troops to Burundi may cause violence to escalade 
• Other past U.S. peace keeping efforts have failed, like in Mogadishu, Somalia 
• If mission fails, Burundi rebel forces may blame the U.S. for interfering  
• Mission failure may result in retaliation against the U.S. 
Group member #4 
• It will be another Iraq 
• It is unsure how long the troops may be in Burundi 
• The U.S and other countries have already pledge to send 4 billion dollars in relief 
to Afghanistan within the next 5 years 
• The resources could be needed elsewhere 
• The U.S needs to focus on rebuilding New Orleans and help the displaced people 
due to Katrina  
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Majority Vote Group 
Your Committee is in favor of Option B (3B to 1A) 
Group members voting for option A 
Group member #1 
• It is the responsibility of the strongest country in the world to assist other 
countries in need. 
• Other countries are sending troops, therefore the United States should also send 
its share of troops 
• Sending troops along with other countries will minimize the time the United 
States will be involved in Burundi  
• If the U.S. does not intervene more civilians will die and be displaced 
• 2,000,000 Burundi civilians have already died because of the lack of aid and 
intervention by other countries 
Group members voting option B 
Group member #2 
• It will be another Iraq 
• It is unsure how long the U.S. troops may be in Burundi 
• The U.S and other countries have already pledge to send 4 billion dollars in relief 
to Afghanistan within the next 5 years 
• The U.S needs to focus on rebuilding New Orleans and help the displaced people 
due to Katrina  
• This is not our fight 
Group member #3 
• U.S. troops may get injured or be killed in Burundi 
• By sending troops to Burundi, more violence may escalade 
• Other past U.S peace keeping efforts have failed, like in Mogadishu, Somalia 
• If peace mission in Burundi fails, rebel forces may blame the U.S. for interfering  
• It is their problem and they should deal with it 
Group member #4 
• Other countries are presently intervening 
• The U.S should wait and see if the situation in Burundi gets worst  
• Peace mission failure in Burundi may result in retaliation against the U.S  
• The resources could be needed elsewhere 
• We won’t have to send troops 
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Majority Vote Group  
Your Committee is in favor of Option A (3A to 1B) 
Group members voting option A 
Group member #1 
• It is the responsibility of the strongest country in the world to assist other 
countries in need. 
• The United States will get criticized by other countries for not intervening 
• Sending troops along with other countries will minimize the time the United 
States will be involved in Burundi  
• If we do not intervene in Burundi more civilians will die and be displaced 
• 2,000,000 of Burundi civilians have already died because of the lack of aid and 
intervention by other countries 
Group member #2 
• There will be minimal risk for our troops 
• The troops will not engage in offensive missions, search and destroy missions 
• The more countries involved in sending troops would maximize the chances of 
success 
• Burundi has suffered without aid from other countries for 14 years 
• Helping Burundi is a great opportunity in developing an allay in Africa 
Group member #3 
• The troops will be responsible in building hospitals and helping displaced people 
return to their land 
• If the U.S. do not intervene, hundreds of thousands of people will be displaced 
into other countries, possibly to the United States 
• By assisting Burundi, the country will be able to develop like other modern 
democratic countries 
• Intelligence reports indicate that a number of high-ranking rebels have fled 
Burundi and are receiving safe heaven from neighboring countries, where they 
send thousands of reinforcements   
• If the U.S. does not intervene now, the situation in Burundi may get worst 
Group members favoring option B 
Group member #4 
• The U.S and other countries have already pledge to send 4 billion dollars in relief 
to Afghanistan within the next 5 years 
• U.S. troops may get injured or be killed 
• Mission failure may result in retaliation against the U.S  
• By sending troops more violence may escalade 
• It is unsure how long U.S. troops may be in Burundi 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Experiment 2 
Information by each Group-member 
Split Vote Group  
The information is Balanced 
Your committee is split even (2 for Option A & 2 for Option B) 
Group members voting option A 
Group member #1 
• As the strongest country in the world, the U.S. has the responsibility to assist 
other countries in need. 
• Other countries are sending troops, therefore the United States should also send 
its share of troops 
• Sending troops along with other countries will minimize the time the United 
States will be involved in Burundi  
• If we do not intervene more civilians will die and will be displaced 
• 2,000,000 have already died because of the lack of aid and intervention by other 
countries 
Group member #2 
• There will be minimal risk for U.S. troops 
• U.S. troops will not engage in offensive missions or search and destroy missions 
• More countries involved in sending troops would maximize the chances of 
success 
• Burundi has suffered without aid from other countries for 14 years 
• Helping Burundi is a great opportunity in developing an allay in Africa 
Group members voting option B 
Group member #3 
• U.S. troops may get injured or be killed, it is impossible to anticipate attacks by 
rebels 
• Sending in U.S. troops may cause violence to escalade 
• Other past peace keeping efforts have failed, like in Mogadishu, Somalia 
• If this mission fails, rebel forces may blame the U.S. for interfering  
• Mission failure may result in retaliation against the U.S. 
Group member #4 
• It will be another Iraq 
• It is unsure how long the troops may be in Burundi 
• The U.S and other countries have already pledge to send 4 billion dollars in relief 
to Afghanistan within the next 5 years 
• The resources could be needed elsewhere 
• The U.S needs to focus on rebuilding New Orleans and help the displaced people 
due to Katrina  
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Split Vote Group  
Un-Balanced Information 
Your committee is split even (2 for Option A & 2 for Option B) 
Although the vote is split, the items of information are favoring one course of action over 
the other, the items of information will favor option B. 
Group members voting option A 
Group member #1 
• As the strongest country in the world, the U.S. has the responsibility to assist 
other countries in need. 
• Other countries are sending troops, therefore the United States should also send 
its share of troops 
• Sending troops along with other countries will minimize the time the United 
States will be involved in Burundi  
• If we do not intervene more civilians will die and will be displaced 
• 2,000,000 have already died because of the lack of aid and intervention by other 
countries 
Group member #2 
• There will be minimal risk for U.S. troops 
• U.S. troops will not engage in offensive missions or search and destroy missions 
• More countries involved in sending troops would maximize the chances of 
success 
• Burundi has suffered without aid from other countries for 14 years 
• Helping Burundi is a great opportunity in developing an allay in Africa 
Group members voting option B 
Group member #3 
• U.S. troops may get injured or be killed, it is impossible to anticipate attacks by 
rebels 
• Sending in U.S. troops may cause violence to escalade 
• Other past peace keeping efforts have failed, like in Mogadishu, Somalia 
• If this mission fails, rebel forces may blame the U.S. for interfering  
• Mission failure may result in retaliation against the U.S. 
Group member #4 
• It will be another Iraq 
• It is unsure how long the troops may be in Burundi 
• The U.S and other countries have already pledge to send 4 billion dollars in relief 
to Afghanistan within the next 5 years 
• The resources could be needed elsewhere 
• The U.S needs to focus on rebuilding New Orleans and help the displaced people 
due to Katrina 
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Majority Vote Group 
Balanced 
Majority vote (3A to 1B) group 
The group is favoring one option over the other, bu  the items of information are evenly 
supporting both options.  The following example is a (3 to 1) vote distribution favoring 
option A, the underlined information favors A. 
Group member voting for option A 
Group member #1 
• The U.S. should intervene in Burundi because it is the responsibility of the 
strongest country in the world to assist other countries in need. 
• Other countries are sending troops and supplies to Burundi, therefore the United 
States should also send its share of troops and supplies 
• Sending troops along with other countries will minimize the time the United 
States will be involved in Burundi  
• If the U.S. does not intervene in Burundi more civilians will die and be displaced 
• The U.S needs to focus on domestic issues like rebuilding New Orleans and help 
the displaced people due to Katrina  
Group member #2 
• It will be another Iraq 
• It is unsure how long the U.S. troops may be in Burundi 
• The U.S and other countries have already pledge to send 4 billion dollars in relief 
to Afghanistan within the next 5 years 
• The U.S. needs to intervene because Burundi has suffered without aid from other 
countries for 14 years 
• 2,000,000 Burundi civilians have already died because of the lack of aid and 
intervention by other countries 
Group members voting for option B 
Group member #3 
• If the U.S. intervenes, troops may get injured or be killed 
• The U.S needs to intervene because Burundi has suffered without aid from other 
countries for 14 years 
• Helping Burundi is a great opportunity in developing an allay in Africa 
• The U.S should not intervene because other past peace keeping efforts have 
failed, like in Mogadishu, Somalia 
• If the peace mission in Burundi fails, rebel forces may blame the U.S. for 
interfering  
Group member #4 
• Other countries are presently intervening in Burundi 
• The U.S. should wait and see if the situation in Burundi gets worst  
• If efforts to bring peace in Burundi fail, there may be retaliation against the U.S  
• There will be minimal risk for U.S. troops sent to Burundi 
• U.S. troops will not engage in offensive missions or search and destroy missions 
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Majority Vote Group  
Un-Balanced Information 
Your Committee is in favor of Option B (3B to 1A) 
The vote distribution is favoring one course of action over the other, but the items of 
information are favoring the least favored option.  In the following example the vote 
distribution is favoring option B, but the number of items of information is favoring 
option A. 
Group members voting option B 
The underlined information will favor B 
Group member #1 
• It is the responsibility of the strongest country in the world to assist other 
countries in need. 
• The United States will get criticized by other countries for not intervening 
• Sending troops and supplies along with other countries will minimize the time 
the United States will be involved in Burundi and will maximize a peaceful 
resolution  
• The U.S. should intervene in Burundi because it is the responsibility of the 
strongest country in the world to assist other countries in need. 
• Other countries are sending troops and supplies to Burundi, therefore the United 
States should also send its share of troops and supplies 
Group member #2 
• Burundi has suffered without aid from other countries for 14 years 
• Helping Burundi is a great opportunity in developing an allay in Africa 
• Sending troops along with other countries will minimize the time the United 
States will be involved in Burundi  
• If the U.S. does not intervene in Burundi more civilians will die and be displaced 
• The U.S and other countries have already pledge to send 4 billion dollars in relief 
to Afghanistan within the next 5 years 
Group member #3 
• The U.S needs to intervene because intelligence reports indicate that a number of 
high-ranking rebels have fled Burundi and are receiving safe heaven from 
neighboring countries, where they send thousands of reinforcements   
• The U.S should not intervene because other past peace keeping efforts have 
failed, like in Mogadishu, Somalia 
• If the U.S. intervenes, troops may get injured or be killed 
• If the peace mission in Burundi fails, rebel forces may blame the U.S. for 
interfering  
• The U.S needs to focus on domestic issues like rebuilding New Orleans and help 
the displaced people due to Katrina  
Group members voting option A 
Group member #4 
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• The U.S can not intervene in Burundi because the U.S. and other countries have 
already pledge to send 4 billion dollars in relief to Afghanistan within the next 5 
years 
• Mission failure in Burundi may result in retaliation against the U.S  
• 2,000,000 Burundi civilians have already died because of the lack of aid and 
intervention by other countries 
• Helping Burundi is a great opportunity in developing an allay in Africa 
• The U.S. should intervene because 2,000,000 of Burundi civilians have already 
died because of the lack of aid and intervention by other countries 
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